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We were slightly concerned, upon having read Eric Winsberg, Jason Brennan and Chris 
Surprenant’s reply to our paper “Were Lockdowns Justified? A Return to the Facts and 
Evidence”, that they may have fundamentally misunderstood the nature of our argument, so we 
issue the following clarification, along with a comment on our motivations for writing such a 
piece, for the interested reader. 
Winsberg et al. claim both that we have misconstrued the aim of their paper, and have failed to 
make a case for our positive claims. Concerning the aim of their paper, they take pains to point 
out a distinction between the claim that government leaders did not meet their epistemic burdens 
in imposing lockdowns, and the claim that “governments were justified in imposing” lockdowns 
(2021, p.1, their emphasis). They, they clarify at length, wished to make the former claim, while 
leaving open the option that governments were justified in imposing lockdowns anyway, not 
having met the “needed…epistemic burdens” (2021, p.3) for imposing them. But we need not 
ruminate on this distinction. The upshot of this, for our purposes, is that they take us to have 
been making a positive argument for the claim that the imposition of lockdowns was in fact 
justified. But, we were not attempting to make this argument. Rather, we were attempting to 
show that Winsberg et al.’s argument does not go through, because they made false factual claims 
about the available evidence in spring 2020. Because their conclusion is based on false premises, 
we contend, the conclusion is not established. Our paper consists entirely of showing why several 
of the key claims Winsberg et al. make are erroneous, and why, therefore, we should not accept 
their conclusion.  
Although Winsberg et al. take us to be “defending lockdowns” (2021, p.10), we make explicit, as 
they themselves cite in their response, that “[w]e aim to show that a convincing answer to this 
question [of whether governments were justified in imposing lockdowns] is to date owing, by 
arguing that a recent paper by Eric Winsberg, Jason Brennan and Chris W. Surprenant (2020)…is 
based on false factual claims and does therefore not succeed in motivating their conclusion” 
(2020, p.1, emphasis added). It should be clear that showing that a conclusion is insufficiently 
supported by evidence does not imply that the negation is true. Winsberg et al. have, we contend, 




lockdowns – this says nothing about whether this conclusion is indeed true, or whether a 
successful argument could be provided in support of this claim. 
Once this is understood, much that Winsberg et al. purport to be perplexed about might make 
more sense. For instance, they question, at length, why we restricted our focus to studies prior to 
May 2020 (see e.g. 2021, pp. 11-12). Clearly, if one wishes to defend lockdowns, one should draw 
from more recent evidence. But if the aim is to assess the claim, made in May 2020,1 that there 
was no available evidence in favor of the effectiveness of lockdowns, it is only fair to draw only 
from evidence available at that time. They question, “with 20/20 hindsight” (2021, p. 10), our 
purported use of an April 2020 working paper by Friedson et al. “[i]n defense of the claim that 
lockdowns are effective”. This indeed might not be the optimal strategy for defending 
lockdowns. But pointing out that their criticism of Friedson et al. was flawed (see van Basshuysen 
and White 2021, pp. 11-13) does not, again, imply an endorsement of this study, or a defense of 
lockdowns.  
Winsberg et al. are absolutely right to point out the devastating costs of lockdowns. We have 
written several pieces premised on exactly the same point (see e.g. White and van Basshuysen 
2021; White and van Basshuysen forthcoming). The many negative consequences of lockdown 
are apparent, particularly their disparate impacts on the poor, and they have been thoughtfully 
and carefully documented in philosophical work, for example, in Peter Godfrey Smith’s 
compelling piece on the costs of extended lockdowns (2021). It is not necessary to make this 
claim by suggesting that deaths connected to layoffs, as of May 2020, might already be in the 
same ballpark as deaths from the virus itself, based on a study which does not make this claim 
and demonstrably overestimated unemployment rates (see van Basshuysen and White 2021, pp. 
13-14). It does not serve the obviously true claim that the imposition of lockdowns is a high-
stakes decision with significant costs to support it with false claims. We believe that it is vital, 
particularly when writing on a matter of such importance, to get the facts right.  
To conduct such a fact check with so little philosophical content is rather thankless work, and 
rarely undertaken in philosophy – it is perhaps for this reason that Winsberg et al. attribute more 
ambitious philosophical aims to our piece. But we believe that such work, particularly in this case, 
makes a necessary contribution to the debate. Questions concerning the justification of 
lockdowns, including what kind of evidence was available, and what kind of evidence is needed 
to meet one’s epistemic duties when making such a high-stakes decision, are crucial and difficult 
topics. This important and contentious debate is impeded (regardless what one’s stance on these 
 




questions is) by the failure to adequately attend to the veracity of the claims made in support of 
one’s argument.2 We believe, in addition, that a more general lesson can be drawn from this 
debate. All applied philosophy rests inexorably on factual claims. If philosophical work is to be of 
any use in making progress on real world issues, then philosophers must take seriously their (dare 
we say it) epistemic duties to attend carefully to the factual accuracy of the claims they marshal in 
support of their conclusions. This is perhaps something that could receive more attention at the 
review stage as well, where, one could imagine, reviewers and editors might assume that authors 
have done their due diligence on this score. 
We conclude by offering one further example from Winsberg et al.’s reply that might serve to 
underscore our points here. In order to demonstrate that the model used in Report 9 (upon 
which both of our original papers focus) produced overly pessimistic results, Winsberg et al. 
consider what it would have said about Florida and Sweden – two places that have received 
attention for their lenient pandemic measures. To determine what this model might have said 
about Florida, they take 6.7% of the baseline scenario provided by Report 9 concerning U.S. 
deaths (2.2 million in total). But this baseline scenario is premised on “the (unlikely) absence of 
any control measures or spontaneous changes in individual behaviour” (Ferguson et al. 2020, 
p.6). Ferguson himself says that this “was never really going to happen” (Cowley 2021). Why? 
Because even in the absence of government measures, individuals significantly change their 
behavior during a pandemic (Gupta et al. 2020, see also van Basshuysen et al. 2021 for 
discussion). It’s not possible to draw anything from comparing a projection of what would 
happen if no-one altered their behavior in any way to the actual situation in Florida.  
Winsberg et al. come up with the number of deaths for Sweden (which wasn’t a subject of Report 
9) by citing the figures in Report 12, also produced by researchers from the Imperial College 
London. This report makes projections for over 200 countries, including Sweden (Walker et al. 
2020). But it is also based on a different model. The findings of Report 9 are based on 
“CovidSim”; an individual-based model which simulates individuals’ interactions in different 
types of locations (like workplaces, schools, at home, etc.) and their movements between 
locations to produce epidemic trajectories. The model used in Report 12, “SQUIRE”, is a 
compartment model. Rather than modelling individual interactions, this model takes a 
macroscopic approach, dividing a population into different groups (the susceptible, exposed, 
infected and recovered) and simulating how the relative sizes of the groups evolve over time (see 
 




van Basshuysen et al. 2021).3 Clearly, we can’t use the numbers produced by Report 12 to say 
anything about Report 9. 
It could well be that there’s an important point to be made about the pessimism of projections in 
Report 9, or Report 12. However, it is difficult to see just what that point is when it is made 
through incautious comparisons, from which we can draw nothing.  
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